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The Arguments for a Specialist Employment Court in New 
Zealand 
Bernard Robertson * 
This paper is concerned with the issue of the structure of the employment institutions. The 
author argues that, if it is agreed that the present position is illogical and incoherent, the 
question is which way should New Zealand move? Should a more specialised and 
autonomous employment law system be created with its own appeals or should the 
Employment Court be abolished? In attempting to answer that question he explores the 
arguments for having specialist employment institutions. In doing so the paper anempts to 
show that the existence of a specialist Court is inconsistent with an employment regime based 
on free contracting. 
Introduction 
There seems to be consensus amongst all who consider the matter, that the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991 (ECA) is philosophically incoherent. Both Maryan Street (1993), fomter 
President of the New Zealand Labour Party, and Ruth Richardson (1995: 226), fon11er 
National Party Finance Minister, agree in labelling the early Parts of the Act, based on a 
philosophy of free contracting, as inconsistent with Part VI which creates the specialist 
institutions. Other writers on employment law in New Zealand agree (Walsh and Ryan, 1993: 
18). 
A notable exception is the present government which appears content to leave the current 
arrangements until it can be seen "how well they are working"(Bradford, 1993). Since no 
specified outputs are required of the Employment Court, there is no way of telling "how well 
it is working". 
There is also general agreement that the current jurisdictional divide between the Employ1nent 
Court and the High Court is impractical and undesirable. Chief Judge Goddard has ppinted 
out that the current rules potentially "expose the same defendant to litigation at the suit of the 
same plaintiff in respect of the same subject matter in two different Courts", than which, His 
Honour said "nothing could be more undesirable or more disgraceful"(1993). On the other 
side of the divide Hammond J has referred to the current position as being redolent of the old 
fOIIDS of action. 1 
• 
I 
Editor, New Zealand Law Journal. The research and writing of this paper was supported by the New Zealand 
Business Roundtable and thanks are due to numerous commentators. The author is entirely responsible for the 
views expressed and any errors made. 
Laser Alignment (NZ) /984 Ltd v Scholz [1993] 2 ERNZ 250 (HC). 
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disputes in court. Employment may generally be an on-going relationship but that does not 
mean that disputes before the Employment Court concern relationships that are actually 
subsisting at the time of the hearing. Many, if not most, concern relationships which have 
already ended. The purpose of the dispute is to reallocate the losses caused by the 
relationship ending in a way other than that originally intended. No evidence is offered by 
the protagonists that Employment Court Judges deal predominantly with on-going 
relationships. 2 
Even if it were true, this problem is not peculiar to employment contracts. Long-tertn and 
subsisting contracts pose different questions from those raised by more short-lived contracts. 
Wholesale energy contracts are a case in point (McNeil, 1978; Gaines, 1995). In these cases 
the Judges are dealing with contracts which will survive the litigation, but it is High Court 
Judges who have to do it. 
The "expertise" argument assumes either that there is something to be expert in or that some 
special skill is required. The first raises the question of the autonomy of labour law, which 
is discussed below. Employment cases can raise questions in contract, tort, equity, restitution, 
public law and even criminal law. It seems then that Employment Court Judges, far from 
being experts in a narrow area, have to have an understanding of the whole seamless web of 
the law, as do High Court Judges. 
The second idea is reflected in comments such as Vranken's: 
The major factor which triggers the need for labour courts rather than the 
courts of general jurisdiction is that judges of a specialist court, because of 
their expertise and background in the subject, are most likely to demonstrate 
the sensitivity required when dealing with labour disputes. (1988: 497) 
Since Employment Court Judges do not negotiate agreements but decide disputes, it is unclear 
why "sensitivity" beyond that required of a High Court Judge is a pre-requisite. Whatever the 
reason, this prediction does not seem to have been borne out, at least in the eyes of the Court 
of Appeal which in one case went so far as to remark that "the manner in which the 
Employment Court's judgment was expressed could only have exacerbated the situation. "3 
Expertise is often said to include knowledge of "custom and practice". This is an interesting 
argument. Other areas of law draw on "custom and practice". Classical contract law grew up 
in this way; indeed Hayek's evolutionary theory claims that the entire common law grew up 
in this way. In these other areas of law judges are infottned as to "custom and practice" by 
counsel and witnesses. This imposes costs where the same matter is explained to a succession 
of judges, but eventually a custom or practice becomes the subject of judicial notice or part 
2 This would have been a natural assumption when cases were between unions and employers. There was 
then a long term relation~hip, the union effectively acting as a seller of labour and the employer as 
purchaser from the union rather than from the employees themselves. 
3 Capital Coast Health Ltd v NZ Medical Laboratory Workers Union Inc 1996] I NZLR 7, 9 per Hardie 
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Not only has there been no rational allocation of functions over time but the present boundary 
lines are incoherent. Current jwisdictional disputes are notorious; many issues arise in the 
High Court which closely resemble employment law matters. Even if it were true therefore 
that employment law were an autonomous branch of the law, the boundary lines drawn by 
Parliament have always left and still leave to the High Court many issues in which the 
Bmployment Court is supposedly expert. 
The greatest of these boundary problems is caused by the distinction between contractors and 
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anomalies will arise. People will arrange their affairs so as to fall just outside the definition 
of a "dependent contractor" and there will be further calls for the Act to be extended to cover 
new ranges of circumstances. The situation is unstable and cannot be made less so by altering 
the definitions. 
Flexibility 
The Officials' Committee believed it important that employment law operate in a flexible 
fashion; that parties were encouraged to settle disputes without going to court and to use non-
legal mediators. This view is mirrored by Maryan Street who observes that employment 
disputes should be resolved, not won or lost (Street, 1993). 
This is not an argument about employment law, but about law and the legal system. There 
are thousands of differences between people every day which do not even go near lawyers. 
If they go to lawyers the bulk are settled informally or formally without going to court. This 
is achieved without any intervention by the state, save that the ordinary Courts encourage 
these activities by a variety of devices. In the case of the ECA settlement of disputes by 
alternative means is specifically provided for by section 3(2). 
There seem to be two possible explanations for this argument. One is an underlying belief 
that all disputes of a legal nature go to court where they are dealt with in the formalistic 
manner of a court case. The other is a belief that organs of state must be involved at an early 
stage in employment disputes, if not in other disputes. Institutions must therefore be 
fashioned which can achieve sensitive resolution of differences. 
The first of these ideas is clearly mistaken. The second would seem to be a conclusion 
requiring argument rather than a starting-point. Even if it were true however, this is ir1elevant 
to the nature of the Employment Court. Cases that reach the Employment Court are the 
equivalent of the cases in other areas which reach the Courts, other methods of resolution 
having been tried or rejected. The desirability of info1mal settlements says nothing about how 
disputes not suitable for such resolution are to be dealt with and is not a reason for having 
a specialist Court. In fact, this argument conflicts with the supposed advantage of the 
cheapness and accessibility of the Employment Court since that feature might be expected to 
encourage more people to take their cases to the Court rather than to allow them to be settled 
infonnally. 
The Officials' Committee hoped to avoid rigid following of precedent. This raises questions 
about the nature of law and how people are to order their affairs if they cannot tell in advance 
what the attitude of the Court is to be. It demonstrates a failure on the part of the Officials 
to understand the distinction between officials who implement policy and judges who decide 
disputed questions of law. Suffice to say however, that the position of precedent in the 
Employment Court is in theory exactly the same as in the High Court. That is to say that a 
previous decision of the Court is not for1nally binding on it but Judges will ustil1ty require 
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will be criticised for unpredictability, bias and excessive activism. If it does not then it 
into question its raison d' etre. 
Parliament 's intentions 
The Officials' Committee suggested that the common law would fail to take account 
equity issues and imbalance of power between contracting parties. There are a number 
responses to this. The first is to say that this is a matter to be addressed by the statute. Once 
it has been there is no reason why a special court should be required to implement the law. 
The only reason for having a special court on this argument is that one wants the judges to 
implement a policy and to pursue a social goal rather than to apply the words of an Act 
Parliament. In that case traditional concepts of the rule of law and the role of judges are 
clearly being departed from. In particular it will be necessary to select the judges carefully 
to ensure that they will in fact pursue this social programme. 
I 
Secondly the argument reveals a particular political viewpoint. It has been demonstrated over 
and over again that "inequality of bargaining power" is a canard. What matters is the 
competitiveness of the market. This viewpoint disregards the mutually beneficial nature of 
voluntary contracting and is in direct contradiction to the general philosophy of the 
Employment Contracts Act. Like most arguments about state intervention in employment 
bargaining, this argument does not explain why contracts of employment are regulated when 
contracts for services are not. If the inequality of bargaining power argument were correct 
it would obviously apply to contractors as much as to employees. 
Finally, it may be observed that there is a certain irony in this argument since it is precisely 
the contention of the Business Roundtable and others that the one thing the Employment 
Court has not been doing in its decisions on substantive employment law is giving effect to 
the will of Parliament (Howard, 1995; Richardson, 1995: 89) 
The Officials' Committee also argued that contract law is not homogeneous and that special 
arrangements exist in other areas. It cited the examples of the Family Court, Fair Trading Act 
and Tenancy Tribunals. Walsh and Ryan (1993: 26) believe this a powerful argument, 
unde1rnining the claim that specialist jurisdiction for labour law would be anomalous. It is not. 
Most contracts today are regulated by legislation which either amends or replaces the common 
law. The High Court nonetheless enforces them, including the Fair Trading Act. The Family 
Court is a part of the District Court and its judges are District Court Judges specially selected 
for that work, but who continue to deal with ordinary District Court business. Tenancy 
Tribunals are indeed state organs created to deal with private disputes, but their status is that 
of administrative tribunals, heavily regulated by the High Court and entirely lacking the status 
of the Employment Court. 
More than anything else, these arguments demonstrate that the Officials' Committee (and 
Walsh and Ryan) lacked any real understanding of (or perhaps sympathy for) the nature and 
working of the ordinary legal system. 
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Special appointments 
It is difficult to resist the conclusion that the real agenda behind the arguments of many 
proponents of a separate Employment Court is that revealed by Maryan Street as "The Labour 
Party's view". Street's argument is based on a world-view which she attributes to William 
Pember Reeves, but which is in fact straight Marxist analysis. That is that the world is made 
up of different classes of people with opposing interests and that the role of the state is to 
stabilise the relationships between these classes. Employment law is one of the devices by 
which this is done. 
Street also mentions the common law's antipathy to combinations (on both sides of the 
employment divide). It is implicit in these argwnents that it is not enough to have a separate 
Employment Court; it must consist of judges who share Street's views rather than the 
traditional views of the legal system, a point consistently made in the legal literature 
(W edderbwn, 1989; Hepple, 1988). The role of the judges is to pursue an agenda which for 
some reason is not set out in the legislation. This is entirely opposed to traditional legal 
values and also to the philosophy of the government and the remainder of the ECA. 
Attempts to predict the decisions of judges once appointed to the Bench are notoriously 
difficult, especially when they are protected by security of tenure. Such attempts are, 
however, much more likely to be successful when there are only six judges in a court which 
deals only with disputes drawn from one area of life. Furthermore, Street's rationale for the 
Court is dependent not on technical legal opinion but on a world view. It should be relatively 
easy to detect lawyers who share that world view. 
The precedent of a specialist Court having been set, the government could obviously side-line 
any judge who did not make the right decisions by creating specialist courts to deal with sub-
divisions of employment law and reassigning the judges. However the logic of Street's 
argument is that tenure should be done away with, so that judges who do not pursue the 
agenda they were appointed to pursue can be dismissed. 
Street's arguments are essentially a muted call for the triumph of socialism over law. They 
constitute an attack on the whole concept of the independence of the judiciary and the rule 
of law. It is alarming to find such views expressed by the President of a mainstream political 
party. The National Party appears completely to have failed to grasp these arguments of 
fundamental principle. It is submitted that the threat to fundamental legal values represented 
by Street's paper alone provides compelling reasons for abolishing the Employment Court 
before a Labour government can come to power. 
Given the public expression of such views the position of the Employment Court after the 
next general election will very difficult. Should a Labour/ Alliance government be returned 
then on every occasion in which the Employment Court appears to exhibit "activism" on 
behalf of employees, it will be accused of taking advantage of political backing to implement 
its own programme, or of implementing the government's programme ahead of legislation. 
If, on the other hand, a National/ACT Coalition were to be in office then at every sign of 
"even-handedness" the Court would be accused by unions of being timid in an attempt to 
stave off abolition. The Employment Court is thus hopelessly and ir1etrievably politicised. 
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The other conclusion from the observation that the Employment Court is cheaper and more 
"user-friendly" than the High Court is that the latter Court should change its procedures. State 
monopolies seldom alter their procedures to become more useful to the customer without the 
stimulus of competition. Such a stimulus is presented by commercial arbitration and the High 
Court has responded by setting up the Commercial List. 18 In general however, as is 
customary with state monopolies, the reaction to backlogs of work is to agitate for an increase 
in inputs rather than to examine the efficiency ·with which the system works. 19 
For present purposes the key point is that if it is true that it is advantageous to parties to use 
the Employment Court, there is no need for a rule giving exclusive jurisdiction, in fact such 
a rule may be counter-productive. 
Autonomy of Labour Law 
The intellectual core of this argument is the claim for autonomy made on behalf of 
employment law. In traditional terms "·employment law" is not a conceptual subdivision of 
"law" as are public law, the law of property, the law of obligations and criminal law. Each 
of these consists of a series of abstract principles. Like family law, maritime law, and many 
other subjects, employment law is a contextually defined subject. Its defining characteristic 
is the subject matter to which principles and rules drawn from various conceptual sub-
divisions of law are applied, namely the employment relationship. 
Claims by academics and practitioners that their area of speciality should be recognised as an 
"autonomous area of law" are neither rare nor surprising. One is entirely free to interest 
oneself in whatever one wishes and even to design courses in such contextually defined 
subjects. These should be studied after the main conceptual divisions of the law have been 
absorbed. The concept of "autonomy" is not self-defining however. Nor is it clear what 
consequences follow from a claim for autonomy. Rather than concentrate on the idea of 
"autonomy" therefore, it seems more profitable to identify what is actually being said about 
employment law and to examine each of these points in turn. 
Employment Lali' not just part of Contract: The first claim frequently met is that employment 
law is not just a subdivision of the law of contract. This is obviously true. The relations 
between an employer and ·employee may involve questions of contract, tort, equity., public, 
property and even criminal law. Judges dealing with employment law questions therefore 
need to be versed in all these areas of law, as do judges of the ordinary courts. The real issue 
is whether applicable rules and principles are to be "developed" in the context of employment 
cases consistently with, or in isolation from, their parent areas of law. 
When the fact that employment law is not merely a subdivision of contract law is deployed 
as an argument it really seems to be a denial that employment contracts are ruled by classical 
contract theory. This again is undeniable. It does not lead to the conclusion that there must 
18 
s.24A Judicature Act 1908 
19 The number of High Court and Court of Appeal Judges has in 1995 been raised to 38. 
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be a separate court to deal with these issues. Almost no contracts in New Zealand today are 
governed entirely by the common law of contract, let alone by classical contlact theory. 
Legislation such as the Contractual Mistakes Act has created new causes of action and new 
remedies. The ordinary courts administer these Acts and, as discussed above, have clearly 
departed from classical contract theory even at common law. 
Employment Contracts are governed by specific legislation: Numerous different kinds of 
contract are governed by specific legislation. Motor vehicle secwities, sales of land, 
international carriage of goods and others too numerous to mention are governed by their own 
Acts. These are all administered by the ordinary courts. 
Employment Contracts are different: This is a diffuse argument because any phenomenon can 
be described as different from, or similar to any other phenomenon, depending upon the 
characteristics chosen for comparison. The complexity and endwing nature of employment 
contracts has already been discussed. The key argument that employment contracts are differ-
ent seems to be a statement that: 
a contract to buy and sell labour is fundamentally and essentially different from any other 
commercial contract. Human labour "cannot be separated from its source" (Street, 1993). 
Sir lvor Richardson has said, "people are not commodities and the perfortnance of services 
is not akin to the supply of goods. "20 
To see that this is not so one only has to consider contracts for the manufacture and sale of 
some item like hand-made chairs. If a customer in a craft shop sees a beautifully made chair 
and buys it, that is certainly a contract for sale. If the customer asks for a second one to be 
made, is that a contract for sale or for services? And if the fortner, why is a contract to 
produce a research paper or a legal manual a contract for services? It is also unclear why any 
arguments about "the dignity of human labour" apply only, for example, to the relationship 
between a restaurant owner and a waiter and not between the customer and the restaurant. 
Secondly, contracts of all sorts can affect livelihoods. The reason a company may make staff 
redundant may be that it has lost, or failed to renew a contract. To protect workers from the 
capricious effects of contractual freedom therefore, state intervention needs to be on a far 
broader band than employment contracts. 
But two more fundamental points render these statements unhelpful under present 
circumstances. The first is the fact that employment law applies only to employees and not 
to contractors. It is submitted that the distinction between employees and contractors is 
entirely inconsistent with the idea that employment law exists to protect some fundamental 
human value. This argument is, if anything, a programmatic one; it is an argument for the 
extension of employment law to contracts for services and that is indeed how we find it being 
used by many. It is therefore disappointing to find some who would cavil at that major 
inroad into individual autonomy falling for the "employment contracts are different" argument. 
20 Telecom South v Post Office Union [1992] I ERNZ 711 (CA) 
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Most fundamentally of all however, this argument entirely misconstrues ordinary contracts of 
sale. We do not trade commodities, we trade rights. A contract of service or of services is 
essentially a trading of the rights to the fruits of an individual's labour. This trade will be 
made for the same reason that any other trade is made, namely that in the hands of the buyer 
the labour is worth more than in the hands of the seller. This may be because certain tasks 
require the organisation of a number of people, or because the buyer of labour has ideas, 
knowledge or access to capital that the seller of labour does not have. 
The employment relationship: the end of the autonomy argument is the proposition that 
employment should be regulated not by contract (and other aspects of private law) but by a 
legal "employment relationship" which would be regulated public-law style. This is based on 
the idea that employment is not a mutually beneficial relationship based on a free transaction 
but upon "subordination" (Wedderburn, 1989), "subservience" (Goddard, 1996) or "economic 
dependence and social subordination" (Wedderburn, 1989; Collins, 1990; Goddard, 1996). 
It therefore needs to be regulated, not to ensure that the wish~es of the parties are properly 
enforced but to ~ensure that social policies determined by the legislature are imposed on 
possibly unwilling parties. 
In so far as the expertise argum~ent depends upon "custom and practice" these arguments 
actually conflict. The supporters of an autonomous labour law do not want the Courts to 
enforce the custom and practice of the parties; they want to change practice by enforcing 
legislatively mandated social policies. That is to say that the autonomy of labour law is 
espoused for the purpose of achieving a change of view on the part of the courts. The aim 
is to correct a perceived imbalance of power which the ordinary law will not correct. The 
rhetoric of autonomy refers to the need to "cut adrift from the rules and methods of civil law 
which prejudice workers" (Wedderburn, 1989: 234). There is a clear assumption in much 
labour law writing that the measure of success of any employment law institution is how 
sympathetic it is to the interests of "workers" (e.g. Hepple, 1988). This is bound to leav~e one 
wond~ering whether the "'expertise" desired is actually expert knowledge of social policy rather 
than of "the realities of the workplace". 
In short this argument is a manifestation of the belief that equal application of rules of law 
will perpetuate the subjection of the "workers" and protect the interests of the monied classes. 
It is surprising therefore, to find defenders of the Employm~ent Court responding to criticism 
of it on the grounds that such criticism endangers the independence of the judiciary: the 
arguments for a separate employment court clearly stem from a philosophy hostile to that 
concept. Anderson commented on recent criticism of the Employment ~Court by saying: 
The suggestion by influential political groups, that a Court should be abolished because its 
decisions do not fully reflect the ideology and interests of that group, goes beyond the bounds 
of justifiable criticism. (Anderson, 1993a: 90) 
But it is clear that the main reason for having a separate employment court is that certain 
influential political groups believe that High Court Judges cannot be relied upon to make 
decisions fully reflecting their ideology and interests. 
The ECA is motivated by the belief that individuals will best flourish and advance their own 
interests when they are free to define those interests for themselves and pursue them as they 
w 
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